

6.5× revenue growth on 1.9× the ad spend.

A profitable marketplace was capped by generic ad groups, weak value segmentation and a difficult mobile checkout. Twelve months later, monthly revenue reached €5.06M on about €134K of derived spend.

Revenue	Actual ROAS	Conversions	Ad spend (derived)
€784K	11.0×	2.29K	€71K
→ €5.06M	→ 37.6×	→ 3.59K	→ €134K
×6.45	×3.41	+57%	×1.89

The brief

The account already looked healthy, so the risk was damaging a profitable system. The brief was to remove the structural ceiling by separating unlike products, improving mobile conversion and giving bidding a value signal.

What the client asked for


- Grow revenue without breaking a profitable account
- Let bidding distinguish high- and low-value orders
- Improve the mobile path to checkout

Where we started

- €784K monthly revenue
- 2.29K conversions at €31.04 each
- 11.0× actual ROAS on roughly €71K derived spend

Baseline: November 2023

The account was already profitable: 2.29K conversions, €784K of revenue and 1,104.54% actual ROAS. Its ceiling was hidden inside generic structure and a weak mobile journey.



Google Ads, Nov 1-30, 2023. 2.29K conversions, €31.04 cost per conversion, €784K purchases / sales, 1,104.54% actual ROAS.

What the baseline tells us

Conversions 2.29K monthly	Cost / conv. €31.04 baseline	Revenue €784K platform	Actual ROAS 11.0× already strong
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- Generic ad groups could not distinguish a valuable component from a low-value consumable.
- A cluttered mobile path lost buyers who already knew which part they needed.
- A strong account-wide ROAS concealed the product-mix ceiling.

What we did

A profitable account was changed in sequence: measurement and segmentation before broad automation, then post-click improvements and demand recovery.

01

segmentation first

Campaigns segmented by brand and category

Structure gave bidding enough granularity to treat a high-value component differently from a low-value consumable.

02

staged rollout

Performance Max launched on top sellers

Automation started with the product lines carrying the densest conversion data rather than the whole catalogue at once.

03

post-click

Mobile journey simplified

The path from product page to order was shortened for buyers who already knew the part they needed.

04

demand recovery

Cart abandoners retargeted

Product viewers and cart abandoners were brought back so intent the account already paid for did not cool unused.

05

value signal

Profit tracked with GA4 and a custom ROAS model


Order value became part of the optimisation signal, rather than treating every conversion as equally valuable.

Why the sequence mattered

Segmentation separated unlike orders, measurement returned their real value, and only then did automation scale the data-dense top sellers. Starting with the full catalogue would have repeated the original problem at greater scale.

Result: November 2024

By November 2024 the account produced 3.59K conversions and €5.06M of monthly revenue at 3,764.13% actual ROAS, on about €134K of derived spend.



Google Ads, Nov 1-30, 2024. 3.59K conversions, €37.45 cost per conversion, €5.06M purchases / sales, 3,764.13% actual ROAS.

The account after the change

Revenue	Actual ROAS	Conversions	Cost / conv.
€5.06M	37.6×	3.59K	€37.45
×6.45	×3.41	+57%	+21%


Metric	November 2023	November 2024	Change
Revenue	£784K	£5.06M	×6.45
Actual ROAS	1,104.54%	3,764.13%	×3.41
Conversions	2.29K	3.59K	+57%
Cost per conversion	£31.04	£37.45	+21%
Ad spend (derived)	≈£71K	≈£134K	×1.89

On the higher cost per conversion.

Cost per conversion rose 21%. That was the intended trade: segmentation shifted spend toward orders worth more. A cheaper conversion would not be an improvement if it returned the account to the old low-value mix. Spend is derived from the screenshot figures.

Why revenue outpaced conversion volume

Conversion count grew 57%, but revenue grew 6.45× because the value of the average attributed conversion changed much more than the number of conversions.



The mix moved upward

Derived revenue per conversion increased from roughly £342 to £1,409. Brand and category segmentation let bidding favour higher-value orders.

The website stopped leaking intent

A shorter mobile path and retargeting supported the media changes. More valuable traffic mattered only if buyers completed the order.

What the result does not prove

It does not isolate the exact share of growth caused by ad-account changes versus website changes or market demand. The before-and-after data shows the combined business outcome.

Being honest about the outcome

The most important negative metric is also the key to understanding the result: each conversion cost more because the mix became more valuable.

What the evidence supports

- Revenue grew 6.45×
- Actual ROAS improved 3.41×
- Conversions grew 57%
- Derived value per conversion rose about 4.12×

What also matters

- Cost per conversion rose 21%
- Derived spend rose 1.89×
- The result combines media, measurement and mobile-site changes

Revenue per conversion rose from ≈€342 to ≈€1,409.

The account did not chase the cheapest possible conversion. It learned to pay more for an outcome worth considerably more.

×4.12

derived revenue per conversion

×6.45

monthly revenue

×3.41

actual ROAS improvement

Case study compiled from Google Ads screenshots published by ConvertLab360. Comparison months: November 2023 and November 2024. Spend and revenue per conversion are derived from screenshot figures. Source page: convertlab360.com/case-studies/google-ads-car-parts-marketplace



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